A recessive LRR-RLK gene causes hybrid breakdown in cotton.

KEY MESSAGE: An LRR-RLK gene causing interspecific hybrid breakdown between Gossypium. anomalum and G. hirsutum was identified by deploying a map-based cloning strategy. The self-destructing symptoms of hybrid incompatibility in most cases are attributed to autoimmunity. The cloning of genes responsible for hybrid incompatibility in cotton is helpful to clarify the mechanisms underlying hybrid incompatibility and can break the barriers in distant hybridization. In this study, a temperature-dependent lethality was identified in CSSL11-9 (chromosome segment substitution line) with Gossypium anomalum chromosome segment on chromosome A11. Transcriptome analysis showed the differentially expressed genes related to autoimmune responses were highly enriched, suggesting that expression of CSSL11-9 plant lethal gene activated autoimmunity in the absence of any pathogen or external stimulus, inducing programmed cell death (PCD) and causing a lethal phenotype. The lethal phenotype was controlled by a pair of recessive genes and then fine mapped between JAAS3191-JAAS3050 interval, which covered 63.87 kb in G. hirsutum genome and 98.66 kb in G. anomalum. We demonstrated that an LRR-RLK gene designated as hybrid breakdown 1 (GoanoHBD1) was the causal gene underlying this locus for interspecific hybrid incompatibility between G. anomalum and G. hirsutum. Silencing this LRR-RLK gene could restore CSSL11-9 plants from a lethal to a normal phenotype. Our findings provide new insights into reproductive isolation and may benefit cotton breeding.

Game Theoretical Analysis on Cooperation Stability and Incentive Effectiveness in Community Networks.

Community networks, the distinguishing feature of which is membership admittance, appear on P2P networks, social networks, and conventional Web networks. Joining the network costs money, time or network bandwidth, but the individuals get access to special resources owned by the community in return. The prosperity and stability of the community are determined by both the policy of admittance and the attraction of the privileges gained by joining. However, some misbehaving users can get the dedicated resources with some illicit and low-cost approaches, which introduce instability into the community, a phenomenon that will destroy the membership policy. In this paper, we analyze on the stability using game theory on such a phenomenon. We propose a game-theoretical model of stability analysis in community networks and provide conditions for a stable community. We then extend the model to analyze the effectiveness of different incentive policies, which could be used when the community cannot maintain its members in certain situations. Then we verify those models through a simulation. Finally, we discuss several ways to promote community network's stability by adjusting the network's properties and give some proposal on the designs of these types of networks from the points of game theory and stability.